cal relations between Hutu and Tutsi. Gurr synthesizes common wisdom in ethnic studies when he writes that "the key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart."7 From before independence in 1962, distinct ethnicity has been a fact of life in Burundi and Rwanda, both at the level of state policy and in individual sentiment.
In all likelihood, the cattle-rearing Tutsi, fleeing famine and drought, arrived in Burundi and Rwanda in successive waves from the north during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The agriculturist Hutu they met had immigrated into this fertile region some centuries earlier, probably from central Africa. The most long-standing inhabitants of the region were the Twa, a small group of potters and hunters. The integration of these different groups was extensive: by the time the colonizer arrived, they spoke the same language, believed in the same god, shared the same culture, and lived side by side throughout both countries. A similar situation seems to have prevailed in neighboring regions of Uganda and Tanzania.
Both countries were kingdoms, with slight variations between them. In Burundi a fine sociopolitical hierarchy prevailed, with a king and a class of princes (pretenders to the throne) at the top, various levels of Tutsi in the middle (those at the royal court, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, socially higher than the ordinary pastoralists, the Tutsi-Hima), the Hutu at the lower level, and the Twa at the bottom. A fair number of people from the lower groups was involved in the exercise of various political functions, and many local notables were Hutu. In Rwanda the political and social hierarchy between Tutsi (who included the king), Hutu, and Twa was more abrupt and lacked some of the fluidity that characterized Burundi's.
In both countries the colonial administration acted through the king and his Tutsi acolytes, the famous indirect rule, consisting of the "incorporation of native authorities into a state-enforced customary order" to the benefit of the colonial power.8 The colonizer reserved education and jobs in the administration almost exclusively for the Tutsi. By the 1950s thirty-one out of thirty-three members of the conseil superieur du pays were Tutsi, as were all forty-five chefs de chefferies and 544 of 559 subchiefs.9 At the same time, an extensive reduction in the number of administrative divisions further distanced the rulers from the ruled.lo While formally the old political structures of both countries, revolving around the monarchy, were still intact, colonization profoundly modified their nature. Political, social, and even economic relations became more rigid, unequal, and biased against the Hutu, while the power of many people of Tutsi origin greatly increased. The nature of the state changed. It became a conduit for the rule of the colonizer, imposing onerous legislation, taxes, obligatory cash crops, and compulsory labor, often abused by local "Tutsi chiefs [who] , secure in the white man's support, acted as rapacious quasi-warlords." II While not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful under colonial rule,"2 almost no Hutu were, and most Hutu suffered greatly from the increased demands imposed upon them. Under these conditions, it is no wonder that the struggle for independence became also an ethnic struggle, a fight as much against the (much closer) local Tutsi "despots" as against the (remote) Belgians.13 It is also no surprise that politics after independence became ethnic politics.
Nature of the Postcolonial State
Between 1958 and 1962 a small group of Catholic-educated Hutu overthrew the monarchy in Rwanda. This so-called social revolution took place with the acquiescence, if not connivance, of the departing colonizers, who during the last years before independence in 1962, in the name of a suddenly discovered attachment to representative structures as well as out of fear of the more radical (leftist, anticolonial) Tutsi elite, had switched their favor to the Hutu.14 The "revolutionary" process unfolded in three stages. In late 1959 there were localized anti-Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some provinces. Hundreds were killed, and many Tutsi fled the country. In 1960 and 1961 legislative elections resulted in the massive victory of Parmehutu, a radically anti-Tutsi party, and the subsequent overthrow of the monarchy. More Tutsi, including the previous powerholders, fled the country. From 1961 to 1964 some of these Tutsi refugees attempted to return militarily, launching small guerrilla assaults from Burundi and Uganda. These assaults were easily stopped, but led to organized mass killings of innocent Tutsi civilians within the country, foreshadowing events thirty years later. In early 1962 more than 2,000 Tutsi were killed; in December 1963 at least 10,000 more died. During this time, between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsi, 40 to 70 percent of the survivors, fled Rwanda.15 In Burundi the monarchy survived the colonial period with more social strength than in Rwanda, and as a result a royalist and biethnic party, Uprona (Union pour le Progres National), led by a prince, Louis Rwagasore, won elections both before and after independence. However, Rwagasore was soon killed by the opposition, and his party fell apart in internal conflict. Competition for state power developed between three groups: the Tutsi-Hima, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and a small emerging Hutu elite. The stakes were high. In Burundi, as in Rwanda and most of newly independent Africa, the state was the main source of enrichment and power in society and conferred great opportunities to those who controlled it. Moreover, following the events in Rwanda, state control became the sole vehicle for Tutsi to retain their privileges, while conversely it was the sole means of rapid social advancement for Hutu.
After a coup d'etat by Micombero in 1966, the Tutsi-Hima, the group that controlled most of the army, monopolized power. To do so, they excluded from political competition most other Tutsi and Hutu. From 1966 to 1993 political and by extension economic power in Burundi was tightly held by three military regimes (Micombero, 1966 -82, Bagaza, 1982 -87, Buyoya 1987 ) that used their military might to keep their privileges. All three presidents were Tutsi-Hima from the same village in the Bururi region, born within two miles of each other (Buyoya is the nephew of Micombero!).16 Almost all positions of importance in Burundi were monopolized by the Tutsi minority. They included the higher levels of the single party (which continued under the name Uprona but became an instrument of the power elite seeking to use the symbols of the royal past to legitimize itself), the full command structure of the army, the police and security forces, and the judicial system (even in 1994, only thirteen out of 241 magistrates were Hutu).'7 Only at the end of the 1980s was there a noticeable increase in the representation of Hutu in the formal economy and public sector.
In conclusion, ethnic divisions played a crucial role in the fierce competition for state power in both countries. In both countries, small groups captured state power with backing from the army.18 Yet the social composition of the state class was very different, if not opposite-Hutu in Rwanda, and Tutsi in Burundi. Their social bases being very dissimilar, these elites employed different strategies to maintain power, thus setting in motion differing dynamics of conflict.
Power and Legitimacy: Strategies for Elite Maintenance
The two regimes Rwanda has known since independence were not averse to using repression. Kayibanda's regime (1962-73) chased out or killed most former Tutsi powerholders and Tutsi politicians, even the most moderate ones, as well as many opposition Hutu politicians who did not join Parmehutu. The second republic under General Habyarimana (1973-94) was a military dictatorship. It killed many powerholders of the first republic (including Kayibanda), and its internal security kept a tight lid on opposition and dissension for almost two decades. The legal system was independent only in name, and impunity was the norm.19 Regular popular elections were a farce in which Habyarimana was always reelected with more than 98 percent of the vote. Any critical press was produced at the risk of the journalist's life.
The main strength of these regimes, however, lay not in their oppression, but in their capacity to legitimize themselves. One strand of legitimization, widely used in Africa, consisted of the depoliticizing argument that the sole objective of the state is the pursuit of economic development for the masses.20 In Rwanda the international community actively bought into that argument, making the country one of the world's foremost aid recipients.21 The second strand was ethnic and emphasized "social revolution." It was tailored largely for domestic consumption. Its discourse was based on the notion that Rwanda belongs to the Hutu, its true inhabitants, who had been subjugated brutally for centuries by the foreign exploiters, the Tutsi, and that in 1959 the Hutu had wrested power away from their former masters and installed a true democracy, representing the majority of the people. The notion that the government is the legitimate representative of the majority Hutu and thus by definition democratic, as well as the sole defense against the Tutsi's evil attempts to enslave the people again, constituted the powerful core of the legitimization of the ruling clique's hold on power. 22 This ideology was accompanied by an institutionalized structure of discrimination, especially in areas that allowed vertical mobility such as modern education, state jobs, and politics. According to Prunier, under Habyarimana's regime "there would be not a single Tutsi burgomaster or prefect, there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, there were two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy, and there was only one Tutsi minister out of a cabinet of between twenty-five and thirtyfive members. The army was of course the tightest."23 The system of ethnic identity papers introduced by the Belgians in 1935 was maintained by the postcolonial governments until the 1994 genocide, greatly facilitating its execution. The return of the Tutsi refugees was categorically denied with the argument that there was no more space in Rwanda. A quota system was installed that limited access of people with Tutsi identification to higher education and state jobs to a number supposedly equal to their proportion of the population.
This quota system was usually only partly implemented. Most authors agree that in the public sector-but not at the highest levels, and not at all in the army-Tutsi remained represented beyond the allocated nine percent. Moreover, in sectors of society less tightly controlled by the state-commerce and enterprise, nongovernmental organizations, and development projects-they were certainly present beyond that proportion.24 The quota system and ethnic identification, then, served more to maintain the distinctions and allow for social control by the state than to actually discriminate. It was part of the institutional structure of Hutu power-administrative reminders that the Tutsi were different from everyone else and the state was watching out for the interests of the majority Hutu.
In Burundi the ruling elite represented a very narrow social base. It thus could not use an ethnic-social discourse to legitimize its position and faced a more permanent (and often violent) challenge. The regime thus implemented a much higher dose of repression. The defining events took place in 1972, although purges had already occurred earlier, most notably in 1965. The fully Tutsi-controlled army, called in to end a Hutu rebellion in a southern province, went on a two month rampage. According to most observers, 100,000 to 150,000 Hutu, almost all educated Hutu in the country (teachers, nurses, administrators), were killed, and 150,000 more fled.25 This rampage created sufficient fear to suppress Hutu unrest for two decades. For many years to come Hutu parents would not send their children to school for fear of making them targets in future pogroms. These events constitute the defining moments in independent Burundi's history. They crystallized Hutu and Tutsi identities and created a climate of permanent mutual fear. The two successive regimes also attempted to use two legitimization strategies. First, they too employed the discourse of development to justify the state's (omni)presence, with less success than in Rwanda, although in the late 1980s, with the 1972 events long past, the international community seemed willing to believe the development myth. Interestingly, the regime often imitated its "successful" Rwandan neighbor; its decentralization policy, for example, was identical to Rwanda's. The second strategy was the exact inverse of Rwanda's (and more in line with general African practice): the denial of ethnicity.27 The official ideology claimed that there were no ethnic groups but only Burundians, equal before the law in Burundi. The mass murder of 1972, if ever discussed, was euphemistically referred to as "events" that resulted from the actions of unspecified "extremists."28 Discussion of ethnicity was taboo in Burundi but dominated people's minds.
From Democratization to Violence
At the beginning of the 1990s three processes combined to pose significant threats to Habyarimana's regime and the small elite that benefited from it. First, internal discontent increased, emanating mainly from disgruntled urbanites but also spreading to the countryside. It generally took a regional form, with political opposition mainly in the south and center. The president's district in the north almost fully monopolized positions of power in Habyarimana's regime, and most public investments took place in that region.29 Widespread corruption, geographical exclusion, and disappointment with the slow pace of development combined in a challenge to the regime from within.30 A second threat was the 1990 invasion from Uganda of the Rebel Patriotic Front (FPR), a small but well trained and equipped guerrilla army led by soldiers who had previously fought in Museveni's war for control of Uganda which was composed largely of descendants of 1959-63 Tutsi refugees. Although the invasion was pushed back, the FPR controlled part of the territory in the northeast, and its threat was permanent. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced, and the economy suffered greatly. Finally, following the end of the cold war, the international community sud-denly rediscovered its attachment to democracy and put strong pressure on Habyarimana's regime to democratize and negotiate power sharing with the FPR and the domestic opposition as a first step toward free elections.31 Thus, political parties were allowed in July 1991, and a so-called coalition government was formed in 1992. Parallel negotiations took place in Arusha to end the civil war and integrate the FPR into the Rwandan army.32
The regime was under attack from all sides, and its most radical factions took recourse in the usual, time-tested solution: the revival of ethnicity. Ethnicity could unite the population around the government, take momentum away from the opposition, combat the FPR, and render elections impossible. These radical factions were not invited to participate in the Arusha negotiations, but they grew stronger nevertheless (with active support from the presidency) and plotted the use of violence to reverse these externally inspired changes. 33 From 1990 onward, under the leadership of a small clique surrounding Habyarimana and his wife known as the akazu (literally, the small house), various dynamics fostered the radicalization of prejudice. First, the FPR threat was extended to all Tutsi. The best documented execution of this strategy came immediately after the FPR's invasion. On the night of October 4, 1990, the army staged an all-night shooting attack on Kigali and blamed it on the internal Tutsi. This accusation fooled the world for some time (it was unmasked only months later), strengthened a sense of psychosis against "the enemy within," and was used to justify the imprisonment of 10,000 Tutsi.34 Most of them were liberated only after months of international pressure; many were tortured; and some were killed.35
More generally, at political rallies and speeches as well as in extremist local newspapers and radio stations (foremost the infamous Radio Libre des Mille Collines and Kangura, a radical newspaper). Tutsis became the subject of hateful propaganda.36 This propaganda included explicit and regular incitations to mass murder, verbal attacks, the publication of lists with names of people to be killed, and threats to anyone having relations with Tutsi. The level of propaganda increased greatly from 1993 onward.
During the same period extremist political parties that openly preached hatred and violence came into being, again with support from the highest echelons. They included the Comite de Difense de la Revolution (CDR), a party to the right of but close to the Habyarimana's, as well as armed militias (the infamous interahamwe and impuzamugambi).37 These parties and groups radicalized and divided the opposition and slowed down the Arusha negotiations. By 1993 all opposition parties had split between radical, "Hutu power" wings close to the CDR and its discourse and moderate wings. During the genocide most of the leaders of the moderate factions were slaughtered.
Between 1990 Under the wary eye of important factions of the army and the Tutsi elite, the government initiated a process of democratization using three foundations: intense propaganda on the concept of national (ethnic) unity, a reconciliation effort with official reports on the history of the country, and an equal distribution of visible political positions between Hutu and Tutsi. In October 1988 a "government of national unity" was formed with twelve Hutu and twelve Tutsi ministers, including a Hutu prime minister. Buyoya, however, cumulated the functions of president of the republic, president of Uprona, and minister of defense, and the departments of justice, interior, police, and the army remained under Tutsi control. Nongovernmental human rights organizations were allowed to exist. A "Charter of Unity" was adopted, and every educated person had to engage in lengthy propaganda sessions to explain to the farmers the notion of unity. In 1992 Burundi adopted a new constitution that for-bade ethnically based parties, obliged all parties to obtain signatures from the country's nine provinces, and conditioned party recognition on approval by the minister of the interior.
Elections were finally held in June 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu and candidate of the Frodebu (Burundian Democratic Front), was elected president with 65 percent of the vote, and his party obtained the majority of the seats in parliament (sixty-five out of eighty-one). Uprona controlled the remainder. Buyoya accepted the verdict of the ballot box and resigned. Rumors about a coup swept through the city. Would the army and radical factions of the Tutsi elite accept this outcome?
On October 21, 1993, low-level soldiers killed President Ndadaye and other dignitaries after only three months in office, with at least passive support from the highest levels of the army. Popular unrest then erupted throughout Burundi, and thousands of Tutsi were brutally killed, especially in the north and center. It is unclear if this violence was spontaneous-a reflection of the anger of the peasant masses at the loss of their first democratically elected Hutu leader-or planned-a policy of Frodebu cadres to get rid of Tutsi throughout the country.42 The army moved in to restore order, killing thousands of Hutu in the process. In total, it is estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 persons were murdered in the three months after the coup; one million fled the country; and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced.
As the president as well as his constitutional successors (the president and the vice-president of the general assembly) had been killed in the coup, a political stalemate followed, which the Uprona used to work its way back into government. After long negotiations, a new president was chosen in January 1994; he died on April 6 in the same plane crash as Habyarimana. More arduous negotiations followed, leading to a convention in October 1994 that gave as many ministerial positions to the Uprona as to the Frodebu. This new government was ridden with infighting and conflict and was largely incapable of ruling the country. It was overthrown in July 1996 in a coup staged by Buyoya. An international embargo followed.
Since In Burundi the most prevalent motive for violence is fear. People in both ethnic groups are deeply afraid of being attacked and attack first, in "defensive attack," to avoid the fate they think is awaiting them.46 For Hutu peasants the fear of a repetition of 1972 is still a strong cause of preemptive violence, and indeed one observes in most accounts of recent violence that rumors of imminent attacks by the army caused them to strike first.47 Since 1993 most Tutsi similarly fear that, if they do not use force to maintain order, they will lose their lives in massive Hutu-led violence. After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this feeling grew stronger still. Clearly, the fear of being killed-and hence the necessity for preemptive attack-can be manipulated on both sides of the ethnic divide.48
In Rwanda primarily prejudice drives people to participate in mass violence. It has been maintained and institutionalized by the powers-that-be to protect their power and privileges. Prejudice has been radicalized every time the elite has been threatened. It also has fed off events in Burundi from 1965 onward, which "proved" the evil nature of all Tutsi.
In both Burundi and Rwanda an alternate motive for participation in mass violence is a desire for revenge. This motive differs from the prejudice described above. Whereas the latter is based on a collective hatred, revenge comes from a specific hatred of one or more persons who are perceived as having committed crimes. For example, a Burundian Hutu who seeks to exact revenge against a Tutsi neighbor who falsely denounced his family in 1972 may not hate all Tutsi, although the sentiment might spill over to others. The issue of revenge is closely connected with that of impunity, a central feature of life in Burundi and Rwanda. It allows the well-connected (primarily but not exclusively people from the ethnic group in power) to steal public funds without sanction; it allows military, police, and mobs to kill without fear. Its impact on society is powerful: it discredits the institutions of law and order and encourages all forms of abuse since there is no fear of punishment. Through all these mechanisms, impunity creates violence. 49 A fourth motive that is often said to explain people's participation in mass killing is opportunism. Personal gain was clearly a motive for militia members at the forefront of the radicalization and killing in both countries. The main militia operating in Burundi in 1995 emerged out of gangs of urban bandits that had been biethnic but became monoethnicized and better equipped after the 1993 unrest.50 In Kigali during the height of the genocide crowds massively looted government offices, international aid agencies, and businesses. Andre and Platteau in a study of a rural commune in northern Rwanda demonstrate how the Hutu killed there during the genocide (only one Tutsi woman lived in the village, and she was murdered, too) tended to be either the wealthier ones or social outcasts, suggesting that "the 1994 events provided a unique opportunity to settle scores or to reshuffle land properties."51 However, generally, the role of opportunism should not be overestimated. For opportunism to exist, there must be a process of violence in which opportunists can insert themselves and do their dirty work; opportunism by definition can not be the primary explanation. 52 A fifth motive often invoked to explain mass participation in violence, especially in Rwanda, is obedience. It can mean a general inclination to obey authorities, a desire to join the dominant group, to not be left behind, or to display solidarity (important for people who live their whole lives in small groups and for whom moving is hardly an option), or the more specific fear resulting from blackmail or threat. Many observers argue that in Burundi and Rwanda there exists a "traditional" culture of obedience to authority and fear of being different and thus people would kill when told to do so.53 Although it is true that the cultire of daily life in Burundi and Rwanda does not value the public expression of disagreement the way western cultures now do, it is a gross simplification to deduce that Rwandans participate in mass murder because they are obedient and conformist by nature. Rwandans and Burundians choose the messages they will act on and modify them according to their own preferences.54 After all, this same population spends an inordinate amount of time and energy hiding revenues and assets to escape taxation, selling products on black markets, ripping out coffee plants, intercropping them with food crops, or badly maintaining them (all forbidden by law), and refusing to show up for obligatory community labor and party meetings. Rwandans are not passive instruments in the hands of their leaders.
In sum, the predominant motive for popular participation in communal violence is prejudice in Rwanda and fear in Burundi. In both countries revenge, set against the backdrop of impunity, has become important, too. Two widely discussed motives, opportunism and obedience, are much less important than often assumed. These motives are by and large individual manifestations of the macro trends described above. Prejudice mirrors, at the individual level, Rwanda's institutionalized discourse of prejudice, while fear and revenge follow directly from Burundi's rulers' use of violence to maintain their privileges. In Rwanda the dividing line was social and regional, not ethnic. The political competition for scarce resources was primarily intra-Hutu. Ethnic violence followed from a "racist" strategy of legitimization used by the ruling elite to maintain its power. By 1994 the Tutsi as a group were outside of the "scope of justice" or the "universe of obligation" of society: the moral values that apply to other people did not apply to them.
Conclusion
The second factor explaining extreme polarization along ethnic lines lies in the occurrence of violence. Dramatic acts of violence can rigidify social boundaries for generations; they can become absorbed in people's sense of self-identity. Although in both countries violence along ethnic lines may originally have been merely part of a strategy of aspiring elites to conquer or maintain power, it became a traumatic element of the culture of prejudice in both countries. In the words of Volkan, "the group draws the mental representation of a traumatic event into its very identity. It passes the mental representation of the event-along with associated shared feelings of hurt and shame, and defenses against the perceived shared conflicts they initiate-from generation to generation."56 As Prunier states eloquently on Rwanda, "in 1959 the red seal of blood put a final label of historical unavoidability on this mythological construction, which from then on became a real historical framework."57 The year 1972 played the same role in Burundi. Moroever, psychologists have long observed a strong relation between victimization and the commission of violence. In other words, people who have been victims of violence or close witnesses of it, especially during childhood, tend to perpetrate the same violent behavior later in their life.
Acts of violence also have psychological effects on the people and groups that committed them. The more violent a group has been against another group, the more it needs to justify its violence to itself, seeking to believe its acts are moral and justified. 58 Theoretically, the most important lesson to emerge from this analysis is that social structure does not explain everything. Content is also needed. The social structure of domination in Burundi and Rwanda is almost identical. Both are exploitative dicatorships that have favored a small class of haves over the large majority of have-nots; both countries, moreover, have almost identical economic and social structures. It thus seems reasonable to put them in the same category when doing comparative research. Yet this categorization fails to capture the dynamics of violence in both countries, which are fundamentally different because the social composition of their elites is different. They have consequently employed divergent strategies of state control and legitimization, leading to different modalities of protest and counterrepression. The result in both cases is ethnic violence, but the dynamics involved are very different. The same degree of political oppression or social inequality does not produce the same effects everywhere; one of the key variables is the social composition of the ruling elite and the ensuing dynamics of legitimacy and protest.
Moreover, the absence of ethnicity is as important a political marker as its presence. The political functions of ethnicity are well recognized. Less easily recognized, however, are the political functions of the absence or denial of ethnicity. In Burundi (and currently in Rwanda) the explicit denial of ethnicity fulfilled an important legitimizing function for the power elite for three decades. If both the denial and the affirmation of ethnicity are political, one should conceptualize ethnicity as an inherently political phenomenon, even when it is absent in political discourse. Aid agencies should keep this point in mind when working in Africa.
Finally, the most recent and most extreme rounds of violence are the direct result of processes of democratization set in motion in large part by pressure from the international community.59 The relation between democratization and violence has long been recognized.60 Both these cases show that the crucial variable is not increased popular demands, but rather the use of violence by elites that feel their position threatened. In both countries the groups that benefited from the status quo, including the higher echelons of the army, had good reason to fear their fate in the case of successful democratization and used violence to defend their privileges. If there are no well-organized, relatively powerful, explicitly democratic groups within a country, the process of democratization can be easily subverted by those who have most to lose. The result may well be worse than the starting situation.
In both cases, too, once the reactionary forces used violence to defend their interests, the international community showed a total unwillingness to defend the processes it had set in motion. In Rwanda foreigners scrambled out of the country, leaving their Tutsi friends and employees to be slaughtered; the U.N. peacekeeping force never received the mandate or the resources to stop the killing. In Burundi a serious attempt to avert a full-blown civil war was not undertaken until late 1994. The absence of international action (if not active support for those using the violence from countries such as France) could be interpreted as an international form of impunity that encouraged further violence. One of the three factors that promote genocide, according to Harff, is the "lack of external constraints on murderous regimes,"61 And Fein has shown that most governments that commit mass violence are repeat offenders, partly because they see that their previous violence was condoned by the international community.62
Since 1993-94 the nature of ethnicity and conflict has become homogenized across both countries. The political actors in each are taking over the other's discourses and tactics. In both Burundi and Rwanda, for example, the Tutsi increasingly define themselves as a small minority faced by a genocidal Hutu majority, while the Hutu image of itself as a socially marginalized, forever misunderstood and exploited majority has become greatly strengthened. People have come to hate "the other" categorically and are willing to destroy any member of its group. This hate can clearly be seen in the extent to which acts of murder are increasingly targeted at children; entire school classes are massacred by guerrillas and the army. This process of ideological unification took place parallel to military homogenization. Hutu rebels from Burundi and Rwanda (and even Zaire) now routinely attack targets in either country together, and Tutsi rulers from all three countries now jointly "defend" themselves more and more openly. What were formerly different dynamics are becoming homogenized. Any hope for an end to violence in either country is receding even further.
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